“I’m The 82d Airborne and This Is As Far As the Bastards Are Going!” – The 82d Airborne Division in the Battle of the Bulge 

By Peter C. Svoboda

On 17 December 1944, the paratroopers and glidermen of the 82d Airborne Division were spending a quiet evening at Camps Suippes and Sissone located near Reims, France. The 82d had recently returned from fifty days of combat in Holland and were in the process of refitting in preparation for any further operations. It was also an opportunity for some much-needed rest. As one paratrooper described it, “We caught up on lots of pleasures, first the girls, next beer, dancing, whatever.”¹ Reims and Paris were close by and offered all the above. 

The fighting in Holland had been costly for the All Americans. Losses among the 82d included 535 killed in action, 622 missing, 1,796 wounded who would not return to duty, and 821 wounded that were eventually discharged from the hospital and returned to the 82d.²

While at dinner with his staff the night of 17 December, Major General James M. Gavin, the 82d’s commander, received a phone call from the XVIII Airborne Corps chief of staff relaying a message from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces that “the situation at the front to the east (Ardennes) appeared to be critical; that the airborne divisions were to be prepared to move 24 hours after daylight the following day.”³ With Major General Matthew B. Ridgway, XVIII Airborne Corps commanding general in England, and Major General Maxwell D. Taylor, 101st Airborne Division’s commanding general back in the States, Major General Gavin had been placed in command of XVIII Airborne Corps. Gavin returned to his dinner guests and took a few minutes to collect his thoughts before issuing any orders which included advising the 82d to move first followed by the 101st. The paratroopers made up the theater reserve as they were the only two divisions in the European Theater of Operations not actively committed to combat. 

By mid-September, Adolf Hitler had announced to his generals, “I shall go to the counterattack.” Hitler pointed to an unrolled map and indicated “here, out of the Ardennes, with the objective Antwerp.”⁴ The preceding August, Hitler had contemplated a counteroffensive to regain the initiative in the West. The enemy forces would create a salient or bulge in the Allies defensive line and break the backs of the Allied forces. In taking Antwerp, Hitler expected to cut off and destroy the British 21st Army Group and the First and Ninth U.S. Armies as well as deny the Allies the use of the vital port.⁵ Hitler ordered an attack over the protests of his generals, who thought the plan too ambitious. Twenty-five divisions would strike the thinly manned U.S. positions in the Ardennes region of Belgium and Luxembourg, cross the Meuse River, then push on northwestward to Antwerp.  

On 18 December the 82d staff shaped a plan of movement to begin one hour after daylight. There was a critical shortage of equipment. Weapons had been turned in, and ammunition, rations and crew-served weapons were in short supply. Winter clothing had not been issued. Personnel shortages existed. In one instance, 200 replacements arrived in the early morning hours of 18 December. They were deployed to various units without any briefing or knowledge of what lay ahead. Some division veterans who had been previously wounded were anxious to return to their buddies. Private Jack Hillman had been wounded in Normandy and suffered a broken leg during the Holland jump. Fed up with the hospital, he decided to go Absent without Leave (AWOL) arriving back “just in the nick of time to enjoy a winter vacation in the Bulge.”⁶ 

The paratroopers began loading into trucks during a freezing rain. The necessary lift to move the 82d and the 101st became a herculean effort. Some of the paratroopers were fortunate to be loaded into canvas covered deuce-and-a-half trucks which kept them relatively dry. One paratrooper remarked, “Boy, I feel sorry for the first Germans those guys get a hold of.”⁷ Initially, both the 82d and the 101st were ordered to “shore up the southern flank of the Allied positions.” That order was subsequently amended and the 82d was assigned to the northern flank in the vicinity of Werbomont.⁸

As the 82d prepared to move, Gavin headed towards Spa, Belgium, to meet with Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges, commander of First U.S. Army. Gavin, Division G-1 Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Ireland, and Gavin’s aide and driver travelled all night through rain and fog under black-out conditions. The roads were treacherous and the absence of bridges on several important highways added hours to an already hazardous journey.⁹ Gavin reported to Hodges as soon as he arrived at First Army headquarters. Hodges’ staff confirmed that the 82d would be up against Kampfgruppe (Battle Group) Peiper of the 1st SS Panzer Division, which was part of the three-corps Sixth Panzer Army. The enemy forces on the northern flank were reported to be located approximately forty-two miles from Meuse River. The available intelligence was reviewed, and it was decided to attach the 82d to V Corps in the vicinity of Werbomont while the 101st would be deployed in and around Bastogne and attached to VIII Corps.¹⁰

Werbomont was approximately thirty-one miles north of Bastogne. Gavin made a request to First Army for armor, tank destroyers, 4.2-inch mortars, and artillery support to be attached to 82d assets, since airborne forces were lightly armed and would be engaging German armor. The paratroopers also had at their disposal the 75mm pack howitzers of the organic glider and parachute field artillery battalions (319th Glider, 320th Glider, 376th Parachute and 456th Parachute Field Artillery Battalions), as well as the 57mm antitank guns of the 80th Airborne Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion. 

Gavin reached Werbomont around midafternoon and conducted a reconnaissance of battlespace which was typical for Gavin, who was known for being a frontline officer always seen in full combat kit carrying an M1 Garand rifle. He concluded that the area had “excellent defensive” features and was the “dominant terrain for many miles.” Gavin returned to Bastogne to meet with Brigadier General Antony C. McAuliffe, the acting commanding general of the 101st. Gavin gave McAuliffe his orders regarding Bastogne and then reported to the commander of VIII Corps, Major General Troy Middleton. Initial intelligence indicated that numerous units had been forced to withdraw or were overrun, including the 99th and 106th Infantry Divisions, which were new to combat having recently arrived in theater. The understrength 4th and 28th Infantry Divisions, bloodied earlier in the year in the Hürtgen Forest, were attempting to consolidate after withdrawing under heavy enemy fire. VIII Corps headquarters in Bastogne was relocating approximately eighteen miles west, out of concern that enemy forces were close by. 

Gavin arrived back at Werbomont with the first 82d paratroopers. The thirteen-hour drive had left them exhausted, stiff, wet, and cold. Each unit immediately established defensive positions along with reconnaissance and security measures. Those who could tried to get a few hours of much-needed sleep despite the lack of cover. The 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) began arriving around 2330, with subsequent units reaching Werbomont throughout the night into early the next morning on 19 December. 

Gavin’s Division Commander’s Report for 19-20 December gives a sense of the initial disposition of forces. In accordance with corps instructions, the 504th PIR advanced and seized the high ground northwest of Rahier. The 505th PIR advanced and seized the high ground of Haut-Bodeux, where they relieved elements of the 30th Infantry Division. The 508th PIR sent one company to the crossroads one mile east of Bra. The 508th (less one company) occupied the high ground in the vicinity of Chevron. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 325th Glider Infantry Regiment (GIR), remained in Werbomont as the division reserve. Company F, 2d Battalion, 325th GIR (2-325 GIR), was assigned to the area of Manhay and Grandmenil to cover the southern flank. 3-325 GIR  was assigned to Barvaux and subsequently relieved by elements of the 3d Armored Division on 20 December. Patrols were pushed out to “gain contact with the enemy.”  

2-401 GlR, which had been attached to the 82d since Normandy, was ordered to move to Barvaux, approximately ten miles west of Werbomont, to protect the division’s rear, thus relieving 3-325 GIR. The 80th AAA Battalion assets “initially adopted its standard anti-tank role, but eventually assigned Batteries D and F to anti-aircraft defense. Batteries A, B and C provided anti-tank support” to the 82d’s infantry battalions and “Battery E maintained a division reserve of firepower.”¹¹  

When the paratroopers arrived in Werbomont, there was no enemy activity because a small group of combat engineers had destroyed the Habiemont Bridge. 2d Battalion, 119th Infantry, of the 30th Infantry Division had held off the advancing German forces. 

Ridgway arrived at Werbomont with his orders from Hodges: locate and destroy Kampfgruppe Peiper, strengthen the southern portion of the XVIII Airborne Corps lines, and be prepared to thwart any enemy advances from the east. The 504th and the 505th PIR had deployed to occupy defensible terrain east of Lienne Creek. In addition, the 508th PIR was assigned to Chevron to provide a blocking position behind the 504th and 505th.¹² Ridgway and Gavin decided to expand the division perimeter and protect the corps southern flank. Gavin assigned that mission to the 325th GIR, while 2-401 GIR, guarded the important road junction and river crossing at Barvaux. Company F, 2-325 GIR, moved to the Manhay-Grandmenil area approximately six miles south of Werbomont. The remainder of the 325th remained in Werbomont serving as both the division and corps reserve. To fill a gap on either side of Lienne, the 508th PIR sent its Company H to occupy the villages of Villetes and Bra, a crossroad just north of Floret while the remainder of the 508th initiated a movement by foot and vehicle to the vicinity of Goronne.¹³ By the morning of 20 December, the small perimeter surrounding Werbomont had expanded to fourteen miles wide (north to south) and eight miles (east to west).¹⁴ The 82d still had not had any enemy contact. That was about to change. 

Colonel Robert H. Tucker, the 504th PIR’s commanding officer and another example of a frontline leader, performed a detailed reconnaissance of Rahier and spoke to a group of civilians who indicated that a large concentration of German forces had moved through the village the previous day, approximately two miles to the northeast towards Cheneux. Gavin gave Tucker permission to occupy Cheneux; if Cheneux were to fall into German hands, the terrain around the village would provide the Germans with excellent fields of fire in and around the Rahier area. 2-504 PIR led the attack, followed by 1st Battalion with 3d in reserve.¹⁵ Tucker’s plan was to attack the Germans and seize their armor. Normally, infantry wanted the support of their own armor. To accomplish this feat, the paratroopers would use panzerfausts, a German antitank weapon the 82d had captured in Holland. These were much more effective than American bazookas and gave the paratroopers a significant advantage.¹⁶ 

A captured German half-track, with a mounted 77mm howitzer, manned by two members of the 80th AAA Battalion, moved up to support 1st Platoon of Company B and gave the paratroopers some much needed firepower.¹⁷ A paratrooper with a Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) riding in the rear saved the crew when he engaged and eliminated an enemy machine-gun crew. German infantry attempted to flank the half-track, “inflicting casualties and forcing them to withdraw.”¹⁸ After using all the ammunition, the paratroopers, “got the hell out of there” as ordered by Tucker. “I know we did a lot of damage, because they were so close. They were only three or four hundred yards in front of us. They had the stuff up there to kill us if they had used it.” The enemy must have been confused by the approaching half-track.¹⁹ Extremely heavy enemy fire drove the paratroopers back.  

As the paratroopers advanced, Tucker received information that a patrol had encountered the 119th Infantry Regiment at the destroyed bridge across the Ambleve River. This indicated that there were no enemy forces in or west of Bois le Chere which meant that so far, the only Germans encountered were in Cheneux. In addition, Tucker knew that the 505th PIR had established defenses at Trois Pont and there was an additional regiment covering the southern flank.  

Tucker decided that a night attack on Cheneux would “negate the Germans’ firepower advantage.”²⁰ Movement at night was difficult so Companies B and C would move abreast, one up the left side, the other up the right side of the road. Within minutes of the advance, the paratroopers came under extremely heavy and accurate enemy fire. In addition, the area was covered in barbed wire which further slowed the attack by the 504th. 

The lack of fire support stalled the attack. Staff Sergeant William P. “Knobby” Walsh, a platoon sergeant in Company B had been wounded in the hand by the initial blast of enemy fire stood and exclaimed, “Let’s get the sons of bitches, they’re killing us.”²¹ According to his Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) citation Walsh led his fellow paratroopers forward, “Advancing three hundred yards, he encountered devastating flanking fire from a 20mm flak wagon. Unable to pull the pin from a hand grenade because of a severe hand wound, he moved quickly to a comrade who armed the grenade. Returning to within ten feet of the weapon, he tossed the grenade into the vehicle, destroying the gun and annihilating the crew.”  

Intense fighting continued as the paratroopers slowly drove the enemy out of Cheneux. Company C overran the German main line of resistance. The fighting had been reduced at one point to hand-to-hand combat between the paratroopers and SS Panzergrenadiers.²³ Other paratroopers, many out of ammunition, used their rifle butts to kill enemy soldiers hidden in spider holes. One paratrooper who had run out of ammunition grabbed a wounded comrade’s rifle and continued to advance while firing his weapon. Running out of ammunition again, and confronted with an enemy soldier, he clubbed the German to death and shattered the rifle butt in the process.²⁴  

By the midmorning of 21 December, 1-504 PIR (less Company A) had cleared Cheneux, capturing numerous pieces of enemy equipment and vehicles, including fourteen flak wagons and a Mark VI Tiger tank. 3-504 PIR (less Company G) met “strong enemy resistance” during the attack, captured Monceau and in turn supported the 504th’s 1st Battalion by moving north of Cheneux and positioning to consolidate. 1-504 PIR (plus G Company) consolidated positions in Cheneux, while 3-504  pushed the enemy across the Ambleve River, establishing defensive positions on its south bank.²⁵ 

 504th losses from the Cheneux attack proved costly. Company B was hardest hit with only eighteen paratroopers able to continue the fight. 1st and 3d Battalions suffered 225 casualties with twenty-three killed. Kampfgruppe Peiper suffered considerable losses of both soldiers and equipment. Colonel Tucker incorporated the captured equipment into the 504th inventory, declaring that the regiment was now the “504th Parachute Armored Regiment.”²⁶ 

Further complicating the battlespace was the need to defend the critical crossroads at St. Vith. Under constant threat by enemy forces to seize vital ground, the enemy would eventually take control of St. Vith. On the night of 21 December, Ridgway ordered the withdrawal of the 7th Armored Division, 106th Infantry Division, 28th Infantry Division (112th Infantry), and Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division, to the 82d area. These units fell back to the Salm River, forming a fortified “goose egg” on the east side of the Salm, anchored on the critical crossing sites of Salmchateau and Vielsalm, a village on the Salm approximately two miles north of Samchateau.²⁷  

While the 504th PIR continued to engage the enemy in Cheneux on 20 December in and around Trois Ponts, (located north of Cheneux), 1-505 PIR advanced to the Salm River relieving the beleaguered 51st Engineer Combat Battalion at Trois Ponts. The engineers were well prepared to face the enemy, armed with a variety of weapons including bazookas, machine guns, and an antitank gun. Their mission had been to wire three bridges for demolition, one over the Salm and two others north of Trois Ponts.²⁸ Two companies of 2-505 PIR crossed the Salm River at Trois Ponts and established a bridgehead.²⁹ 

The 1st SS Panzer Division, under the command of SS-Oberführer Wilhelm Mohnke, looked for crossings of the Salm River to reach Trois Ponts and reestablish contact with Kampfgruppe Peiper. To cross the Salm, Mohnke had to fight through the 505th PIR.³⁰ 2-505 PIR was concentrated at Trois Ponts as the 505th’s defensive line extended southward approximately 8,000 yards. 3-505 PIR had responsibility for the Salm River crossing at La Neuville and Grand Halleux. 1-505 PIR was south of 3d Battalion and tied into the 508th PIR. Gavin’s orders “were to defend the river from the west bank, place only minimal forces on the east bank, and keep the enemy from crossing at all costs.”³¹ The brutal winter weather continued to take its toll on the paratroopers. One soldier recalled, “Our bedrolls were in Werbomont. We had nothing to keep us warm during the coming night. The temperature dropped below freezing and it snowed.” The paratroopers “settled down to wait in the bitter cold. No fires, no lights, no smoking,” just waiting for the enemy to make its next move.³² 

2d Platoon of Company E engaged a German reconnaissance force in the early hours of 21 December. One enemy half-track was disabled by a landmine and the other was engaged by a bazooka team and destroyed. The ensuing firefight left several German soldiers dead; the remainder retreated. An enemy assault followed around mid-morning with an estimated 800 SS soldiers of the 1st SS Panzer Division, supported by tanks and self-propelled guns, struck Company E. The paratroopers attempted to repulse the attack with the support of 81mm mortars and the 456th PFAR’s 75mm howitzers, along with Company E’s 60mm mortars. To the surprise of the paratroopers, the enemy moved straight up the road, completely exposed.³³  

As the fight intensified Company F moved forward to reinforce Company E. The SS troops appeared on the verge of overwhelming the paratroopers, so the order was given to cede the bridgehead to the enemy. With the Germans so close to their positions, it would be impossible to disengage, so the order was given for Company D to flank the Germans. With no other choice but to withdraw, Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Vandervoort rushed forward and gave the order to “get the hell out of there.” Using “walking fire” in reverse Companies D and F withdrew. Unfortunately, Company E had lost almost half its strength during the fight.³⁴ 

During the withdrawal under heavy enemy fire, a 57mm gun crew with the 80th AAA Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Jake Wertich, continued to keep enemy infantry and vehicles under fire. Several members of the gun crew were killed or wounded as enemy forces flanked their position. According to his DSC citation, Corporal Stokes M. Taylor seized “a Browning Automatic Rifle and ammunition amd ordered his men to fall back, while he took up a position on the road and covered their withdrawal by fire. With complete disregard for his personal safety, and with full knowledge of the overwhelming odds against him, Corporal Taylor raked the hillside with intense and accurate fire which prevented the enemy from gaining the edge of the woods to fire on his anti-tank squad as they effected their withdrawal. After his ammunition was exhausted, Corporal Taylor was seen to be hit by enemy rifle fire.” Lieutenant Wertich manned the gun by himself until he was killed. Wertich and Taylor were both posthumously awarded the DSC for their heroic actions.³⁵ 

The 505th would hold the Salm River crossing. Numerous attempts by the 1st SS Panzer Division proved unsuccessful and as a result Kampfgruppe Peiper was unable to continue the offensive.³⁶ The 82d had defeated Kampfgruppe Peiper at Cheneux, forcing the Germans to withdraw. The paratroopers’ successful fight against the 1st SS Panzer Division at the Salm River made certain that this “elite unit could no longer be considered an armored division.”³⁷ 

The fight to maintain its horseshoe defense in and around Werbomont would continue for the 82d. An eventual withdrawal of St. Vith was ordered. 2-401 GIR, 1-325 GIR, and the 508th PIR fought major actions in and around Braque-de-Fraiture, Regne, Salmchateau and Vielsalm. At one point the 82d was up against two SS Panzer divisions. 

 A lone gliderman from the 325th GIR was digging a foxhole for an outpost near the road when a tank destroyer from the 7th Armored Division moving west from Salmchateau on the highway toward Fraiture spotted him. Inquiring if this was the frontline, Private First Class Vernon Haught looked up and said, “Are you looking for a safe place?” The tank commander said, “Yeah.” Haught responded saying, “Well buddy, just pull your vehicle behind me. I’m the 82d Airborne and this is as far as the bastards are going.”³⁸ The courage and tenacity of the glidermen and paratroopers showed their mettle against potentially overwhelming odds. 

Sergeant Steve Zaley of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3-505 PIR, was returning from a thirty-day leave that had been given prior to the fight in the Ardennes. After crossing the Atlantic on the RMS Queen Mary and a train ride across France to Reims, Zaley reported in and was told to go to supply to draw any available weapons and equipment before catching a ride to Belgium.  

The supply clerk said, “So tell me what’s your pleasure for weapons?” Zaley rattled off a list, “Thompson submachine gun, two mag(azine) bags with 30 round clips, 45-caliber pistol with two clips and four fragmentation grenades.” He also received a snow parka and gloves. Zaley arrived at the company command post to discover he was not even supposed to have returned to Europe but had orders to Fort Benning to serve as an instructor at the jump school. He also learned his best friend, Henry Bystrak, had been killed in action and several others in his squad had been wounded. Steve thought, “I should have been here and he should have been there” at home on leave. Survivor’s guilt would grip Zaley the rest of his life.³⁹ 

The 82d endured almost continual combat operations through the rest of December, January, and into February, finally ending on 18 February 1945 when the division was relieved by the 9th Infantry Division, allowing it to return to its camps outside of Reims. The paratroopers had suffered through the loss of their comrades, extreme cold (reportedly the worst winter in forty years), a lack of supplies, hypothermia, frostbite, and for those who had served in the Mediterranean and contracted malaria, the extreme cold often brought on a recurrence. By late March, the 82d would return to combat, assigned to relieve various infantry units on the west bank of the Rhine. 

Gavin praised his paratroopers for their role in halting the German offensive in the Ardennes, stating that the 82d “moved 150 miles with its first combat elements going into position in less than 24 hours and the entire Division closing in a new combat in less than 40 hours from the time of initial alert. It fought, stopped and held against best divisions the German leader, Field Marshal Von Rundstedt, could pit against it, protecting the North shoulder of the Allied line, preventing the German breakthrough from turning North to Liege, Belgium and providing a safe area through which trapped Allied units could withdraw from the breakthrough area.” 

The actions of the 82nd Airborne Division during the Battle of the Bulge exemplified their courage, adaptability, and tenacity. Against overwhelming odds, facing brutal winter conditions and an enemy determined to exploit every weakness, the paratroopers and glidermen held their ground, thwarted the German advance, and helped secure a critical foothold for the Allied counteroffensive. Their sacrifices not only shaped the outcome of one of World War II’s most pivotal battles but also cemented their legacy as one of the finest fighting units in history. By examining their contributions, we honor the memory of those who served and gain a deeper appreciation for the enduring spirit of resilience that defines the All American Division. Their determination can be summed up with the declaration, “I am the 82d Airborne and this is as far as the bastards are going.” 

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About the Author

Peter C. (Pete) Svoboda is an author whose first book, Headhunter 5-73 CAV and Their Fight for Iraq’s Diyala River Valley, was published in 2019. He is currently working on a book of short stories that will cover the 82d Airborne Division’s twenty years of Global War on Terrorism combat deployments, with a working title of Stand in the Door. Pete is currently a member of the adjunct faculty at Virginia Commonwealth University where he teaches a course in Incident Management and Emergency Planning as part of the Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness curriculum. He will also begin teaching U.S. Army history to senior ROTC cadets beginning in Spring 2025. Pete supports the mission of the National Museum of the United States Army as a tour docent. 

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1. Phil Nordyke, All American, All the Way: The Combat History of the 82nd Airborne Division in World War II (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006), 585.  ↩︎
2. Robert P. Anzuoni, “I’m the 82nd Airborne Division!” A History of the All American Division in World War II After Action Reports (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 2005), 351.  ↩︎
3. Guy Anthony LoFaro, The Sword of St. Michael: The 82nd Airborne Division in World War II (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2011), 599. ↩︎
4. Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: The Battle of The Bulge. The U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1993), 4. ↩︎
5. Richard W. Stewart, American Military History, Volume II: United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2008 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2010), 159. ↩︎
6. Nordyke, All American, All the Way, 587-88. ↩︎
7. Ibid, 589.  ↩︎
8. Arthur Powers, Never a Dull Moment: The 80th Airborne Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion in World War II (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2024), 126.  ↩︎
9. Anzuoni, “I’m the 82nd Airborne!”, 204.  ↩︎
10. Ibid, 212. ↩︎
11. Powers, Never A Dull Moment, 127.  ↩︎
12. LoFaro, The Sword of St. Michael, 444. ↩︎
13. Anzuoni, “I’m the 82nd Airborne Division!”, December 1944 After Action Report.  ↩︎
14. LoFaro, The Sword of St. Michael, 445. ↩︎
15. Frank Van Luntenen, Blocking Kampfgruppe Peiper: The 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment in the Battle of the Bulge (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2015), 54. ↩︎
16. LoFaro, The Sword of St. Michael, 446. ↩︎
17. Nordyke, All American, All the Way, 596-97. ↩︎
18. Ibid, 597.  ↩︎
19. Ibid. ↩︎
20. LoFaro, The Sword of St. Michael, 446.  ↩︎
21. Nordyke, All American, All the Way, 603.  ↩︎
22. https://www.tracesofwar.com/persons/38418/Walsh-William-P-Knobby.html ↩︎
23. Ibid, 604.  ↩︎
24. Van Luntenen, Blocking Kampfgruppe Peiper, 61.  ↩︎
25. Anzuoni, “I’m the 82nd Airborne Division!”, 213.  ↩︎
26. LoFaro, The Sword of St. Michael, 448. ↩︎
27. Ibid, 451. ↩︎
28. Ibid, 451-52.  ↩︎
29. Anzuoni, “I’m the 82nd Airborne Division!”, 212-13.  ↩︎
30. LoFaro, The Sword of St. Michael, 453.  ↩︎
31. Ibid. ↩︎
32. Nordyke, All American, All the Way, 610; LoFaro, The Sword of St. Michael, 453.  ↩︎
33. Nordyke, All American, All the Way, 454.  ↩︎
34. Ibid, 454, 613, 615; LoFaro, The Sword of St. Michael, 454.  ↩︎
35. Nordyke, All American, All the Way, 624. ↩︎
36. LoFaro, The Sword of St. Michael, 475. ↩︎
37. Nordyke, All American All the Way, 627. ↩︎
38. Steven R. Zaley, They Are Only Gone If Forgotten (Self-Published, 2018), 475-76.  ↩︎
39. Anzuoni, “I’m the 82nd Airborne Division!”, 43.  ↩︎